QBOT – A HTML Smuggling method to focus on victims | Path Tech

Why is this method used?

When the sufferer opens the HTML attachment, it decodes the embedded recordsdata and saves them regionally. Attributable to encrypted patterns, no malicious content material passes by means of the community, bypassing community filters and firewalls; subsequently, this assault methodology is gaining reputation amongst cyber criminals.

QBot assault circulation:

In one of many paperwork we analyzed, it was discovered that an embedded HTML factor was created with the “doc.createElement” methodology. Attackers took benefit of this tag to distribute payloads in zip recordsdata. We are able to see within the following picture base64 encoded information for the zip file:-

Fig.1- HTML bootleg template

When opening an HTML file, it tips the consumer as downloading a zipper file, whereas the zip is already embedded in an HTML file. The password is highlighted within the picture under, “abc555”.

Fig.2 – Obtain Zip

After extracting the zip file, we get the “REJ_2975” disk picture file, which once more accommodates a number of recordsdata.

Fig.3 – Recordsdata extracted from iso

The “REJ” shortcut file is then accountable for performing the extra assault. The duty of this file is to execute the “reprocess” command script within the “oslo” folder. Afterwards, the script will execute the ultimate QBot Loader DLL with the title “counteractively.dat” as proven within the following determine:

Fig.4 – Execution Instructions

Later, the payload is injected into wermgr.exe by way of course of flush:-

Fig.5 – Execution Instructions

DLL evaluation:

This Qbot Loader DLL is a compiled x32-bit Delphi binary with no export capabilities.

Fig. 6- QBot charger info

Qbot is utilizing protection evasion checks; on this case, it’s for Home windows Defender simulation by checking the file “C:INTERNAL__empty”.

Fig. 7: QBot checking Home windows Defender

Achieve persistence:

Qbot makes use of registry entries and self-replication to realize persistence. Because the payload executes, the Qbot features its persistence in 2 steps:

1. Copying itself to the folder talked about under:
   %AppDatapercentRoamingMicrosoftRandom strings
2. Create a registry worth pointing to the above payload

The folder creation and deleted DLLs are loaded by way of regsvr32.exe, as proven under:

Fig. 8- Folder creation with random title

Dump configuration information to the registry. Within the newest payload variations, Qbot has stopped creating its configuration file in “.dat” format. Now, it writes its cloned DLL entry to the sufferer as encrypted registry keys to ‘HKCUSoftwareMicrosoft[RandomString]’Hive.

Fig. 9 – Registry Entries

Communication C2:

As proven within the determine under, the injected course of “wermgr.exe” is making a reference to encrypted IPs:-

Fig. 10 – Communication IPs C2

Conclusion:

It isn’t possible to disable JavaScript in most environments, as too many professional methods and net functions require its use. On high of that, many professional JavaScript frameworks use obfuscation methods to reduce file sizes and enhance the velocity of net functions. Subsequently, blocking obfuscated JavaScript just isn’t a sensible possibility. Subsequently, customers are suggested to be very cautious whereas dealing with suspicious emails with HTML attachments. Fast Heal clients are already protected in opposition to these kind of assaults.

IOCs:

html attachment

Md5: 6783003a0737331c66a0b8fc0a35754d

Detection Title: HTML.QBot.47153

QBot Loader DLL

MD5: 52EC63A6F7F089862E648112FE8E9F1D

Detection Title: Trojan.Qakbot

URL:

http://156.221.50.70:995

http://190.26.159.108:995

https://82.205.9.83

https://14.54.83.74

http://190.199.186.80:2222

https://134.35.3.115

https://176.44.119.201

https://45.160.33.131

http://37.245.136.224:2222

https://132.251.244.3

http://206.1.216.174

https://1.20.185.200

http://196.89.213.210:995

http://182.183.211.179:995

https://163.182.177.140

http://190.26.159.29:995

https://197.205.161.175

http://91.171..72.224:32100

http://101.109.135.92:995

https://41.97.56.148

https://14.246.151.165

https://94.36.5.99

https://186.18.210.235

https://79.155.159.202

http://190.204.112.15:2222

MITER Mapping:

Subject material consultants:

Anjali Raut

Nihar Deshpande